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INTRODUCTION 
The majority of Ford's Brief urges the Court to apply incorrect legal standards of 
review, reframes issues and presents misleading facts to argue waiver, harmless error or 
invited error on several issues where none occurred. Each incorrect factual statement and 
erroneous legal standard relative to Ford's argument will be addressed separately in this 
reply. Appellants should be awarded attorney's fees under Utah R. App. P. 33, for having 
to respond to Ford's frivolous misrepresentations of fact and law. 
Ford argues that this Court should accept the jury's verdict as accurate and binding 
even though the driver's door latch was physically altered by Ford's expert after it was 
removed. The jury's verdict was based on false evidence. Ford presented the altered door 
latch and several blow-up photographs to the jury. The latch went into the deliberation 
room with jurors. This Court should review the issue and reverse with instructions. 
Ford argues appellants were given "extraordinary opportunities to develop their 
theories and present them to the jury." (Ford's Brief, p. 7.) Not so. The trial court 
prematurely cut-off appellants' request for door latch discovery with a protective order. 
(R. 3303-3304.) Then, almost a year after expert discovery cut-off, shortly before trial, 
Ford was allowed to remove the driver's door latch, (which was how the subtle fraud was 
perpetrated). (R. 6811-6812.) The trial court also reversed itself on a major part of 
appellants' case, after appellants told the jury that it would hear evidence of Ford's 
knowledge of the Explorer's design instability. (See Appellants' Issue VI.) 
1 
KELLIE MONTOYA'S OPPOSITION TO FORD'S CROSS-APPEAL 
At trial, Ford presented no evidence of the date Kellie Montoya filed suit against 
Ford. Consequently, Ford has failed to marshal the record in support of its claim that the 
jury's special finding is against the weight of the evidence, and this precludes review of 
Ford's appeal. The evidence presented at trial establishes that the jury sufficiently 
identified, by an objectively reasonable standard, the date Kellie should have known to 
sue Ford for the design defects which caused her injuries. 
Ford's notice of appeal does not appeal the trial court's denial of its 2005 summary 
judgment motion against Kellie. Therefore, the issue has not been preserved. The trial 
court did not err in rejecting Ford's summary judgment motion. Kellie's frontal lobe brain 
injury was so severe she was life-flighted to the hospital; she could not recall the events. 
Attorney Keith Barton was hired for the sole purpose of obtaining a settlement from 
Geico insurance for Kellie's medical expenses. Ford's claim that Barton should have 
known to sue Ford for the Explorer's instability and design defects back in IVlai cli 19W 
should be rejected. The Explorer's defects and instability were concealed from the public 
and were not known until later when state attorney generals and the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration began inquiry into the Explorer's safety. 
Ford's statement in its brief that attorney Barton inspected the Explorer is 
completely false and the exact opposite of the record. 
# # * 
2 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE TAMPERING WITH THE DOOR LATCH ISSUE WAS RAISED 
BELOW AND ARGUED; THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THE COURT 
CONSIDERED THE ISSUE; THUS, ADEQUATELY PRESERVING 
THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Fraud perpetrated on a jury is a serious allegation involving corruption of the 
judicial process itself (In re Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 1985)) and 
should be reviewed.1/ A fraud perpetrated on the jury is an affront to the judicial system. 
In the interest of justice, this Court has the inherent authority to review the facts and 
evidence supporting the altered/tampered with door latch contention.2/ (See AOB, p. 15, 
fh.7.) 
A. There was No Waiver. Ford argues that appellants only alleged the 
tampering of the door latch issue under Utah R. Civ. P. 50 for JNOV. (Ford's Brief, p. 
19.) Not true. Appellants moved for JNOV and a new trial based on Utah R. Civ. P. 59 
(a)(6). (R. 10949, 10959 [Addendum 50].) Appellants thereafter amended their notice to 
identify Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) as a further legal ground to grant the new trial. (R. 
11236-11237.) Appellants' amended notice states the additional grounds relate back to 
the motion already filed. (R. 11226-11227 [Addendum 51].) Appellants' reply brief 
1
 Equitable relief against fraudulent evidence is not a statutory creation but a 
judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise 
from a hard and fast adherence to a court-made rule. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,248 [64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250] (U.S. 1944). 
2
 A jury's verdict can be set aside when the ends of justice require it. An appellate 
court can also set aside the jury's verdict. (R. 10954,10959; AOB p. 15, fn. 7; Kilpackv. 
Wignall, 604 P.2d 462,466 (Utah 1979) citing Weeks v. Latter-day Saints Hospital, 418 
F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1969). 
3 
rebutted statements made by Ford in its opposition to appellants' motion for new trial. 
Ford's contention that it had no opportunity to reply to appellants' amended notice 
and reply brief should be rejected. (Ford's Brief, p. 21, fii. 9.) Ford ignores the record. 
Ford filed a rebuttal in its motion to strike portion of plaintiffs' reply brief, arguing 
Caulfield did not tamper with the latch. Ford did not object to appellants' amended notice 
on the Rule 59 (a)(1) ground; Ford only moved to strike the "tampered with" or 
"manipulated" language in appellants' reply brief that argued Ford's expert, Ed Caulfield, 
had perpetrated a "fraud" at trial. (R. 11351-11356 [Addendum 96].) Ford's motion to 
strike was not granted, and Ford has not appealed the issue. (R. 11397-11398 [Addendum 
97].) Ford cannot now complain. 
The record also establishes that appellants' Rule 59 (a)(1) ground was preserved 
for appeal. During oral argument on May 7, 2007, the trial court stated that it had read 
the record and understood the issue before it was that the latch had been tampered with. 
(R. 11467, p. 12 [Addendum 83].) The court then entertained the "fraud" argument. 
Appellants argued Ford's expert had tampered with the latch. (R. 11467, p. 8, 12-18 
[Addendum 83].) Ford vigorously argued the merits of the fraud issue, including 
spuriously stating to the court that Mr. Gilberg had moved the fork bolts on the driver's 
door latch with pliers during his vehicle inspection while Ford's counsel was present. 
(See, R. 11467, pp. 21-22 [Addendum 52].) Ford's statement was false. [Addendum 53, 
Gilberg Affidavit, f 4.] Ford erroneously and misleadingly now argues that the trial court 
denied appellants' Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) amended motion as untimely. (Ford's Brief, 
4 
p. 7, 21.) No such ruling was made on untimely or on any other ground. (R.11375 
[Addendum 17].) 
Ford further argues that the fraud issue was not preserved for appellate review 
because it was not addressed in the trial court's Memorandum of Decision. (Ford's Brief, 
p. 21.) Again, Ford's argument is flawed. Appellants had no basis to ask the court to 
reconsider a final order. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically rejected the practice or 
seeking reconsideration of final orders. See, Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, PI [135 P.3d 
861] (Utah 2006). 
Also, State v. Muffins, 2005 UT 43, P8 [116 P.3d 374] (Utah 2005) cited by Ford 
arguing the trial court had no jurisdiction, is not on point and is distinguishable from the 
circumstances here. (Ford's Brief, p. 21.) Mullins' first motion to withdraw his plea was 
not pending at the time his subsequent motions were filed, thus, his subsequent motions 
did not relate back, for jurisdictional purposes, to his first motion. In contrast, appellants' 
timely new trial motion was pending. Appellants amended notice of motion and reply 
brief was also filed and pending. When the court did not grant Ford's motion to strike 
and allowed the parties to argue the fraud issue at oral argument, the matter was 
entertained and pending. Cf., Peirce v. Peiree, 2000 UT 7, P16 [994 P.2d 193} (Utah 
2000) [issue addressed before memorandum of decision preserves review]. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) authorizes the trial court to grant a new trial based upon 
"irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury...which...prevented [a party] from 
having a fair trial." Appellants were not required to make a contemporaneous objection 
5 
or motion for mistrial to bring a new trial motion on this ground.3/ The statute does not 
require a contemporaneous objection, only an irregularity in the proceedings. (See, 
Ford's Brief, p. 19.) Furthermore, the error here was not invited because the court gave 
the appropriate instruction, Jury Instruction No. 10.4/ (R. 11484, p.l 1 [Addendum 99].) 
No other curative jury instruction would have corrected the error caused by presenting 
false evidence for the jury's consideration. Further, a contemporaneous motion for 
mistrial, as Ford now suggests, even if successful, would have provided the same remedy 
sought in the lower court by filing the new trial motion for relief. Thus, there was no 
waiver of the relief sought on (a)(1) grounds. 
B. A New Trial is Warranted because the Irregularity in the Proceedings 
Prevented Appellants from Receiving a Fair Trial. 
Mr. Gilberg did not agree with Ford's expert, Ed Caulfield, about the position of 
the jaws. (Ford's Brief, pp. 18,22-23.) Ford incorrectly analyzes Gilberg's testimony and 
misstates the state of the photographic evidence. Also, contrary to Ford's bold assertion, 
Gilberg does not state the latch was in the "same" position. (Ford's Brief, p. 22.) 
Gilberg went on to testify that the fork bolt was well beyond the secondary 
position, stating "its really open." (R. 11474, p. 218 [Addendum 92].) Ford takes 
3
 Ford argues waiver based on State v. King, 2006 UT 3, P13 [131 P.3d 202] (Utah 
2006) and State v. Baker, 935 P. 2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997). (Ford's Brief, p. 21.) These 
cases involve peremptory challenges of jurors and are not on point. State v. Finder, 2005 
UT 15, P 46 [114 P.3d 551] (Utah 2005) is inapplicable. Here, the trial court 
acknowledged it was entertaining the (a)(1) ground at oral argument. Hence, no waiver. 
4
 Jury Instruction No. 10 states: "If you believe any witness has willfully testified 
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, 
except as that witness may have been corroborated by other credible evidence." 
6 
Gilberg's testimony out of context. Continuing, Gilberg explained the fork bolt was 
pinned in the (bent up) latch due to ground contact. Ford's counsel posed this 
hypothetical: "take out the ground contact...the fork bolts5/ would be in a completely open 
position?" To which Gilberg explained that the impact of the door with the "B" pillar 
could smack the fork bolts before they were fully open. (R. 11474, RT 218 [Addendum 
92].) 
When Gilberg testified, he did not discern the subtle alteration of the latch; that the 
fork bolts were moved further towards a closed fixed position. So, when viewing the 
latch for the first time after the surrounding sheet metal door skin was removed, Gilberg 
assumed the latch was in the position it was in when still in the door, and answered Ford's 
counsel's question: "Well, they were pretty much in the condition you see here." Gilberg 
testified that the latch was 90-percent open; his equivocal response reveals his not 
recalling the fork bolt in the "new" position.6/ (R. 11474, pp. 217,219,220 [Addendum 
92].) 
Contrary to Ford's misstated claim, the driver's door latch's "open" position is not 
merely observed in "a few photographs." (Ford's Brief, p. 22.)7/ Ford's engineer, Mr. 
5
 "Jaws," "fork bolts" and "latch bolts" refer to the same part on the latch. 
6
 An examination of the photographs [Addendums 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60] 
reveals that the deformed sheet metal of the door skin itself is pushing one fork bolt 
slightly towards closed by only a slight degree, the "nose" or "ear" extending onto the 
opening of the "fish mouth." [Addendum 53, Gilberg Affidavit, % 6.] However, the 
driver's latch was "fully open" in terms of the latch operation depiction language. 
7
 Ford argues Gilberg's affidavit does not address the alleged door latch tampering 
issue. (Ford's Brief, p. 26.) Again, not true. Gilberg's affidavit states that Tiede's report 
7 
Tiede, who inspected the door closely before the inside operation became an issue, 
reported no latch bolt deformation, and described the latch in a folly open operating 
position. (R. 11013-11015 [Addendum 61].) The fork latch bolts were never bent or 
deformed out of plane, at least not until Packer Engineering got its hands on the latch 
after removal. Mr. Gilberg states in his affidavit that the door latch bolts were always 
found in an open operating position. [Addendum 53, Gilberg Affidavit, II7.] 4CNone of the 
other photographs taken by the other Ford engineers during their vehicle inspections show 
that the fork bolts had ever been moved following the subject accident." Emphasis added. 
Ibid*l 
Ford argues Gilberg9 s affidavit does not undermine confidence in the verdict.9/ 
(Ford's Brief, p. 26.) Not so. When Caulfield's associate Kevin Vosburgh first inspected 
the driver's door latch, he also photographed it "open." (R. 10996-11000 [Addendum 60 -
indicates the latch operation remained in the same position as when Mr. Gilberg inspected 
it, and that all of the photographs depict the latch operation in the same position and 
"show that the fork bolts had never been moved following the subject accident." 
[Addendum 53, Gilberg Affidavit, ffif 6, 7.] 
8
 Ford collaterally argues the latch was found in a locked position inconsistent 
with the Clayton theory. (Ford's Brief, p. 25.) Ford neglects Mr. Gilberg's testimony 
concerning the ground contact deforming the lock activation levers and the ease by which 
the lock can relock. (See, R. 11474, pp. 219-220 [Addendum 92].) Gilberg does not 
agree with Ford. 
9
 Ford also misstates that Caulfield consistently testified that all of the 
photographs depict a partially open latch. (Ford's Brief, p. 23.) Not true. He initially 
testified the latch was photographed by at least two other Ford experts in an open 
position. (R.11481, p. 99-101, 106 [Addendum 100.] Of course Caulfield then claimed 
the photos only showed the latch partially open. After being caught during cross-
examination, Caulfield was not going to admit the state of the evidence. However, Ford's 
expert Tiede truthfully reported the latch operation fully open. 
8 
Trial Exhibits P-320-D, P-320-K5 P- 467-47, P-467-52, P-467-125].) By trial, the fork 
bolts were manipulated out of plane and pushed to a partially closed position to match 
Caulfield's transverse load test theory. (R. 11480, pp. 50, 51-52 [Addendum 63].) 
Significantly, at trial, Ford presented no evidence that there was any damage observable 
through the "factory window."10/ (See, R. 6748 [Addendum 49].) The tampering was so 
subtle it was not noticed until Ford put Mr. Caulfield on the witness stand, and then began 
examining him with a choreographed series of questions together with large blown-up 
photographs showing the planes of the fork bolts out of alignment.11/ 
Ford contends the error in admitting the tampered-with door latch and blow up 
photographs was harmless because there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
(Ford's Brief, pp. 24, 25.) Harmless error occurs where the error is sufficiently 
inconsequential and there is no reasonable likelihood it affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Here, it cannot 
be said the error was inconsequential. Ford relied on the altered door latch evidence to 
argue Caulfield's theory to the jury: 
10
 It is highly relevant that Tiede did not find any latch bolt deformation. 
Significantly, this Court can also weigh Ford's purported reason for removing the driver's 
door latch and the timing of its removal almost a year after discovery cut-off. 
11
 Ford argues that appellants have misstated Chewining v. Ford, 354.S.C. 72,78 
[579 S.E.2d 605] (S.C. 2003). (Ford's Brief, p. 22, fii. 10.) Not true. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court granted review of the decision which reversed a lower court order 
dismissing an action for "fraud upon the court" and an "independent action in equity for 
fraud"against Ford pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) and affirmed the appellate court's 
judgment. As noted in appellants' brief, this is not the first time Ford has allegedly 
perpetrated fraudulent testimony. (See AOB pp. 19-20.) 
9 
... In the rod foreshortening theory, bing„ the latch is open...Not this latch. Not 
the Clayton latch. The [fork] pawls were bent partially open, and the, and the 
entire latch mechanism was bent. Here it is again. And here's 956-B. These are 
in evidence. The latch itself is in evidence. Look at the bowing there. Very 
much like the transverse test that Dr. Caulfield did...You don't get that folks, 
from this latch theory. The physical evidence shows it didn't happen that way." 
(Emphasis added; R. 11483, pp. 63-64 [Addendum 12].) 
Furthermore, harmless error review and a sufficiency of evidence examination as 
argued by Ford, does not apply to review of the denial of appellants' new trial motion 
made pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1). (See AOB, pp. 14-15.) An abuse of discretion 
standard applies. {Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, P25 [82 P.3d 1064] (Utah 
2003). Ford also ignores Meyer v. Srivastava, 141 Ohio App. 3d 662, 666-667 [752 
N.E.2d 1011] (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), an Ohio appellate court case where a new trial was 
granted on substantially analogous grounds.12/ (See AOB, p. 20.) Utah courts often look 
to other jurisdictions with similar rules for guidance. State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, P23 
[79 P.3d 937] (Utah 2003).13/ The trial court here did not apply the correct legal reasoning 
in denying appellants9 new trial motion as argued and submitted on the (a)(1) ground. 
Reversal under the circumstances is warranted. This Court can also instruct the lower 
court to reconsider its decision or hold an evidentiary hearing on the (a)(1) ground based 
on Gifberg*s affidavit. 
12
 In Meyer v. Srivastava, supra, photographs of a water heater from a different 
residence were shown to the jury as the actual water heater involved. Similarly, the 
introduction of the altered door latch and blown up photographs warrants reversal or 
reversal with instruction to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether there was a 
fraud/irregularity perpetrated on the jury. 
13
 Ohio Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) is worded the same as Utah's rule. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING 
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE THAT WAS EXCHANGED PURSUANT 
TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 26. 
Ford's semantics to make the basis of their legal argument is frivolous and flawed. 
(Ford's Brief, p. 28.) At trial, appellants sought cross-examination of Caulfield on the 
opinions of Mr. Tiede. (R. 10234, 10235 [Addendum 69]; R. 11481, p. 24, 28.) 
Caulfield9 s deposition states he considered Tiede5 s report in reaching his own opinions in 
the case. (R. 10239.) Appellants argue on appeal that they sought to "impeach" Caulfield 
with the evidence in the report pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26, and the evidence was 
admissible. (AOB, p. 22, 24.) Impeachment evidence is evidence used to undermine a 
witness' credibility. Glacier Land Co., L.L.C v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., L.L.C > 2006 
UT App 516, P29 [154 P.3d 852] (Utah Ct. App. 2006). Impeachment means cross-
examination. 
Ford's argument that Tiede's findings lacked foundation should be rejected. Ford 
in essence, vouched for Tiede's report and its contents by exchanging it pursuant to Rule 
26. (R. 11481, p. 28.) Ford's brief altogether ignores the advisory committee note for 
Rule 26 (a)(3) discussing "expert reports" which provides: "[i]n effect, the report will 
serve in lieu of responses to standard mterrogatories.'' Emphasis added. 
Tiede's findings of fact and photographs from his vehicle inspection were 
produced by Ford as discovery in lieu of a standard interrogatory. The evidence was 
admissible impeachment evidence.14/ 
14
 Ford argues appellants were limited in their cross-examination to matters raised 
on direct examination. (Ford's Brief, p. 30, fh. 15.) Tiede's report, exchanged by Ford 
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Ford's argument that Tiede was required to lay a foundation is also flawed because 
Caulfield considered Tiede's report in reaching his opinions in the case. (R. 10239.) It 
was therefore appropriate to cross-examine Caulfield on Tiede's findings. (R. 10234; see, 
Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, P30 [977 P.2d 1193] (Utah 1999). 
The error was not inconsequential. (Ford's Brief, p. 30.) Tiede worked for Ford for 
over thirty years and designed Ford's door latches. Tiede not only photographed the 
driver's door latch in an open operating position, he also reported no latch bolt 
deformation upon his personal inspection. In other words, Tiede made specific findings 
similar to Mr. Gilberg. Thus, this evidence was not merely cumulative as Ford argues, 
but material corroborative evidence and a party admission, which supported appellants' 
theory of how the door defectively opened. The primary means of protecting the 
occupant during a rollover is to keep the door closed. (R. 11474, p. 251 [Addendum 92].) 
The importance of the defective latch was life or death for Tony Clayton. (AOB p. 22.) 
III. BOTH ISSUES RAISED IN THE OPENING BRIEF REGARDING 
FORD'S SPECIAL JURY VERDICT FORM ARE REVIEWABLE. 
Appellants submitted their proposed special verdict form on February 8, 2007, 
before the jury retired. (R. 10377-10383 [Addendums71].)15/ Ford again erroneously 
argues "waiver." In fact, Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, P30-31 [158 P.3d 562] 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26, would have undermined Caulfield's credibility about his 
subsequent findings. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party at trial. 
Utah R.Evid. 607. 
15
 (See Ford's Brief, p. 33, fii. 21) Appellants also submitted a revised jury form 
on February 9,2007, which the trial court apparently failed to file as part of the record. 
[See Addendum 73]. 
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(Utah Ct. App. 2007) does not apply. Rather, Utah R. Civ. P. 49 (a) controls. "Waiver" is 
defined in Rule 49 (a). By submitting a special verdict form setting forth proposed 
special findings, appellants preserved the issue. There was no "waiver."16/ 
In Cambeltlntl Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987), the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that special interrogatories might have assisted the jury in sorting 
out difficult issues presented. The Supreme Court remarked that the general verdict 
submitted in Cambelt may well have permitted the jurors to avoid grappling with those 
complex issues. Cambelt is also distinguishable. Cambelt did not object to the trial 
court's failure to provide the jury with special verdict findings. In contrast, appellants 
submitted their own special findings to the trial court, which were rejected in favor of 
Ford's unreasonably simplistic verdict form. Ford's special jury verdict form also 
removed some of the defect theories of liability from the jury's consideration without a 
summary judgment motion or directed verdict. It caused the jury to avoid grappling with 
complex issues and was akin to a general verdict. 
Appellants objected to the actual special verdict form given. (R. 11483, pp. 116-
117 [Addendum 12].)17/ Ford's special verdict form asked the jury to consider and answer 
only one question: "Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer defective and unreasonably 
16
 The waiver rule only applies "if counsel, either by statement or act" 
affirmatively represents no objection. See, Moore v. Smith, supra, 2007 UT App 101, 
P30". Appellants "acted" to preserve their objection to the omitted special findings by 
submitting their own special verdict form. 
17
 Ford's special verdict form did not allow nor require the jury to consider or 
make findings on appellants' causes of action for negligence, failure to warn and breach 
of warranty. Ibid. 
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dangerous." Ford then capitalized on the omitted findings by arguing: 
...and you have a jury verdict form and there's one question that starts with: 'Do 
you find that there is a defect in this Ford Explorer? Yes of no?9 And if you answer 
no, then your work is done. (R. 11483, p. 83 [Addendum 12].) 
The error was exacerbated when the trial court sequestered the jury, forcing the 
jury to rush through deliberation under duress. (See Argument VIII, infra.) 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CAUSED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GIVING 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 27, 30 AND 31. 
Instruction No. 27: The dicta submitted in Ford's instruction states: "there is no 
duty to make a safe product safer." Its implication was that the Explorer was safe and 
there was no duty to make it safer. The instruction had the potential of misleading the jury 
on the issue of "duty" as instructed in Jury Instruction No. 23 which states in part: A 
product is defective in design...if there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which 
outweighs the benefits of the design. In determining whether the benefits of the design 
outweigh the risks to which the product exposes the consumer... you may consider... "The 
availability of a substitute product that would serve the same function but would not be as 
dangerous. [%\ The ease or difficulty with which the unsafe character of the product could 
be eliminated without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its 
utility." (R. 10575 [Addendum 75].) 
Instructions No. 30 and 31: These two jury instructions were extremely prejudicial. 
They induced the jury to speculate that something caused Tony's inattention which 
caused him to go off the road, rather than focus on whether the defectively designed 
automobile which was the cause of the rollover. Ford argues these instructions were 
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proper because Trooper Pace and Geoff Germane opined that Tony had likely fallen 
asleep at the wheel. (Ford's Brief, p. 37.) This testimony was speculative and cannot 
constitute "sufficient evidence" in light of the actual eyewitness, Hector Cantu, who 
followed the Explorer for miles and observed the rollover. See, Day v. Lorenzo Smith & 
Son, 17 Utah 2d 221, 224, 226 [408 P.2d 186] (Utah 1965). 
Mr. Cantu did not see Tony speeding nor asleep, nor observe Tony swerve to avoid 
anything in the road. The rollover began before the Explorer left the pavement. (R. 
11476, p. 156 [Addendum 5].) Cantu did not see any problems until he observed the 
Explorer with two tires up18/ before it left the pavement. (R. 11529, p. 10 [Addendum 4].) 
Ford suggests "harmless" error claiming the jury never considered whether Tony 
was negligent. (Ford's Brief, p. 36.) This too is speculative because Ford argued: 
[T]he first thing I want to talk about...The first theme was the fact that this was 
caused by driver error. That Mr, Clayton drifted off the curve, he 
overcorrected, and he caused it to go off the road and trip in the median. 
Circumstances that would cause many vehicles to rollover....The facts have 
shown that the Explorer didn't cause Tony Clayton to lose control. He lost 
control because he was asleep, inattentive, and he went off the highway 
exactly where the road curves. (Emphasis added; R. 11483, pp 6-7 [Addendum 
12].) 
Based on Ford's closing argument, it is reasonable to expect the jurors considered 
Tony's negligence in deliberations. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO BIFURCATE RELEVANT 
CAUSATION INJURY EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
Ford illogically argues that any error caused by bifurcating the trial was harmless 
18
 Two wheels up in the air means the rollover has begun. (R. 11476, p. 156 
[Addendum 5].) 
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because the jury found no defect. (Ford's Brief, p. 38.) In support of its claim Ford 
argues "harmless error" citing State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, P. 20 [20 P.3d 888] (Utah 
2001). The harmless error standard again does not apply. The sole test is an abuse of 
discretion. An abuse of discretion standard requires the court to evaluate prejudice. 
Prejudice is shown if the issues are not clearly separable. Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil 
Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
Ford next unsoundly argues that appellants objected to evidence pertaining to the 
severity of the rollover (See, Point X, infra), therefore bifurcation was permissible. (See 
Ford's Brief, p. 39.) Appellants objected to the fallacious use of statistical evidence 
involving dissimilar vehicles which Ford used to argue the severity of the rollover. 
Appellants did not object to physical causation evidence which was necessary to establish 
elements required to be proven under the jury's instructions. Appellants were required to 
prove the gravity of danger posed by the design. It is precisely due to the inability to 
present relevant occupant injury causation evidence that appellants were unable to meet 
their burden of proof at trial. The exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial and 
contributed to the jury's lack of defect finding. 
The excluded evidence established that Kellie, who remained seat-belted during 
the four complete rolls, suffered a sheer frontal lobe brain injury, facial lacerations, her 
teeth were knocked out, and her eyes were knocked out of line, requiring prisms for life 
(R. 11461, p. 129 [Addendum 3]) all because the occupant protection system was 
inadequate. Additionally, Ford took the remarkable contradictory position that Tony's hip 
could load the driver's door latch with an extreme amount of force to a breaking point, 
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but could not load the seat belt causing it to unlatch. The lack of any injury on Kellie's 
left side during the rollover was relevant circumstantial evidence to establish Tony did not 
collide violently against her at all, belying Ford's insistence that Tony was unbelted. (R. 
8759.) 
Ford concedes on p. 39 of its brief that the jury heard no expert testimony about 
the nature of the occupants' injuries. The evidence would have been pertinent to 
Instruction No. 23.19/ (See A.O.B. p. 335) An automobile manufacturer is liable when it 
fails to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 
F.2d 774, 780 (10th Cir. Wyo. 1978). The bifurcation order precluded appellants from 
offering evidence integral to the jury's consideration of occupant protection and the 
crashworthiness of the Explorer's design. This was highly prejudicial to Kellie because 
the jury was instructed that it could find Ford liable for Kellie's injuries even if Tony 
caused the accident. (R. 10593.) The gravity of the injury is highly relevant to assess the 
degree of care required to protect the occupants in a foreseeable event, a rollover. (R. 
10593 [Addendum 75].) Therefore, a new trial is warranted. (AOB, p. 33.) 
VI. APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE 
TRIAL COURT REVERSED ITSELF MID-TRIAL AND EXCLUDED 
RELEVANT FORD DOCUMENTS. 
Ford again suggests a harmless error standard of review (Ford's Brief, p. 40) when 
19
 A product is defective if it fails to perform safely as an ordinary consumer or 
user would expect...or if there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs 
the design. The jury can consider...The gravity of danger posed by the design and the 
likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause injury or damage. (R. 10575 
[Addendum 75].) 
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an abuse of discretion standard applies. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 
1993). Before the Clayton Explorer was sold, Ford engineers recommended a safer, 
alternative design. Therefore, the trial court acted unreasonably when it excluded 
evidence and testimony mid-trial that Ford knew that the Explorer was dangerously 
designed and had an opportunity to correct the defects. 
Courts in at least two other jurisdictions have ruled similar evidence relevant and 
admissible. See, Bado-Santana v. Ford Motor Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 79, 92-94 (D.PR. 
2005) [in an Explorer rollover case, the court denied Ford's motion to exclude evidence 
of design and development history of the Bronco II, finding the evidence relevant to 
Ford's knowledge of and failure to correct stability design flaws]; see Buell-Wilson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 160 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1132 (Cal. App. 2008) on remand. 
Ford urges this Court to ignore the California appellate court case. (Ford's Brief, 
p. 43, fh. 27.) The fact that other jurisdictions have found the same evidence relevant and 
admissible should be considered persuasive. Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, PI8 [70 
P.3d 78] (Utah 2003). 
A. Don Tandy's Affidavit (Ford's Addendum F) is Inconsistent with his Trial 
Testimony in Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Company and the Excluded Ford 
Exhibits, 
Ford urges the Court to believe Don Tandy's statements about the variances in the 
different model's design.20/ (Ford's Brief, p. 41.) Mr. Tandy signed off the UN 105, 
20
 Ford's own documents show the Explorer's high center of gravity was tied to 
the size of the tires. The Explorer was failing Ford's J-turn tests. A extremely relevant 
document excluded was Ford's new computer modeling policy which was relevant to the 
truthfulness of Tandy's testimony. [Addendum 45 (RGR 15846).] 
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Clayton model Explorer as being "resistant to rollover/5 using computer simulations that 
were not saved so the engineering data could not be peer reviewed. While Ford was 
working on testing the Explorer, Ford created a new computer modeling policy which 
involved Tandy. [Addendum 45 (RGR15846).] At the time of appellants5 trial, Don 
Tandy had been paid over twenty million dollars by Ford to testify as their "expert55 and 
tell the public the Explorer was a safe vehicle with P-235 tires and it was passing all tests. 
(R. 11482, pp. 46-47 [Addendum 94].) 
Furthermore, in Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 
1130, Ford's contention that the Bronco II and UN 46 design evidence was inadmissible 
was out right rejected. (See Ford's Brief, pp. 41-42.) The Buell-Wilson case involved a 
1997 4-door Explorer. The trial and appellate court found that the Wilson family had 
"presented substantial evidence of the design carry-over from the Bronco II to the 
Explorer, evidence of the intermingling of the development and testing of the Bronco II 
and the Explorer and the similar source of rollover problems between the Bronco II and 
Explorer for the Court to find the two vehicles are substantially similar.55 (Ibid.) The 
Buell-Wilson court logically reasoned the evidence was admissible as follows: 
Ford asserts that it was error to introduce evidence of the Bronco II because they 
were different vehicles, citing many differences in design...[T]he evidence went 
to similarities in a particular design flaw, not the vehicles as a whole. Where a 
plaintiff intends to adduce evidence of the functioning of related products to prove 
that the product in question was defective, identical conditions need not be 
present... Id. at p. 1131; emphasis added. 
In Buell-Wilson v. Ford, Don Tandy, testified that both Explorer models, the UN 46 
("First Generation55 Explorer formerly designed and named Bronco II 4-Dr) and the 1997 
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UN 105 (same model as the Clayton Explorer), contained design flaws of similar engine 
heights and center of gravity, and track width. (R. 8839, 8841, 8842.) 
Appellants' amended complaint alleges that Ford engaged in inadequate stability 
and rollover crash worthiness testing of the Explorer and similar vehicles. (R. 727, 
Amended Complaint, % 31 a [Addendum 1].) Prior to trial, appellants submitted an offer 
of proof. The excluded evidence was relevant to appellants design defect and fraud case. 
The excluded evidence proves the UN 46 Explorer was an elongated version of the 
Bronco II. The proposed UN 46 Bronco II 4-door model's name was quickly changed by 
Ford in 1989 to the "Explorer," after adverse rollover publicity. [Addendums 36, 37, 38, 
39.] Importantly, the UN 46 (First Generation Explorer) was not passing Ford's J-turn 
tests with P-235 tires; Ford's engineers knew this, and for the public's safety, 
recommended to management to not release the Explorer with tires that made it unstable. 
Ford created "strawman" tests for the Explorer to pass their "own" guidelines. Ford 
engineers stated: "Release 4 Dr. only with base P225 AS Tires." [Addendums 33, 34, 35.] 
Ford engineers also recommended implementing design modificationsto the UN 
105 (Clayton) model immediately by widening the SUV's track by 2 inches and by 
lowering the front roll center 2 inches. [Addendum 32 (EXP4 1581).] The design 
modifications were not done. Ford made a decision to essentially carry over the same 
engine height rather than take advantage of the newly designed SLA suspension to lower 
the center of gravity. (R. 8826 [Addendum 25].) Ford engineers and management also 
had a proposed safer SUV design which was planned for release in 1995. (To replace the 
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UN 46) The PN38 had a lower center of gravity, a 63-65 inch track width, a much wider 
and safer track width than the UN 105 and UN 46 designs. [Addendum 42, at p. 15681.] 
However, the jury never heard any of this evidence even though it would have 
showed Ford's notice of a particular design defect, the magnitude of the defect, and 
danger involved, and the Ford's ability to correct it. See, Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 
915 F.2d 641, 650 (11th Cir. 1990). 
B. Appellants were Prejudiced by the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence 
which would have established; Ford changed the name of Bronco II to 
Explorer; that the Explorer was not passing Ford's safety tests: and Ford 
had a Safer. Alternative Design. 
When evidence is offered to show only that defendant had notice of a dangerous 
condition, the requirement of similarity of circumstances is relaxed. The excluded 
evidence was relevant to prove that Ford knew it was designing and manufacturing a 
vehicle with the same stability design defects as the Bronco II. See, Buell-Wilson v. Ford 
Motor Co., supra, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1107,1132. 
At trial, appellants' engineering expert, David Ingebretsen, was only allowed to 
testify about Exhibit P-l 18 [Addendum 44] which showed the Explorer was failing 
Ford's accident avoidance maneuver test after the Clayton Explorer was manufactured, 
not before. (R. 11476, pp. 155-156 [Addendum 5]) Ingebretsen testified that the 
Explorer's P-235 tires raised the center of gravity (R. 11463, p. 89 [Addendum 9]); the 
Explorer was unstable and did not pass Ford's computerized J-tum test until the computer 
model was tweaked 20 pounds, the weight of a small child. (R. 11476, p. 159 [Addendum 
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5].) The excluded evidence affected appellants' substantial rights. / See, Turner v. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994); Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 
801 P.2d 920,924 (Utah 1990). 
Ford illogically and unreasonably argues appellants were unable to substantiate 
their claim. (Ford's Brief, p. 42, fn. 25.) Appellants could not substantiate their claim, not 
because they did not have legitimate relevant evidence to present through their own 
expert and through the cross-examination of Ford's expert Don Tandy, but because the 
trial court rejected appellants' offer of proof and erroneously excluded it. Ford's counsel 
capitalized on the court's mid trial ruling: 
We talked about their [Ford's] design process. About establishing the mission. 
Setting the targets. You got to select the dimensions. You have to build and 
rebuild prototypes. And that's what Ford does. And then they test those 
prototypes. And then they go back to design...And they don't release it until it 
meets their own guidelines and their own standards....And they have standards far 
above what any governmental agency requires of them. Particularly in rollover 
resistance. And they confirm design intent by these testings. And so here's, 
here's a summary of what we learned, I think from Mr. Tandy....To be sure that it 
had high rollover resistance. Ford designed it to pass track testing, the J-turn 
testing, the ADAMS model. And Ford is the only manufacturer that makes 
itself do that... Defendant's Exhibit 938, Ford's resistance to rollover guidelines. 
Not required. Nobody makes them do this. They impose it on themselves. They 
won't let the vehicle out to the public unless it passes. They do the ADAMS 
J-turn simulation... But then there was the allegation, Well, they just do the 
model and they don't, they don't correlate. That's false. We brought in Mr. 
Tandy, the guy that did the work. Here's the exhibits. They're in evidence, okay? 
Didn't ask him [Mr. Tandy who was Ford's witness] about his work. Didn't 
ask him about anything having to do with these tests. Why? Because they 
know the work was done. They know the tests were done...(Emphasis added. 
R. 11483, pp. 69, 70, 71-72 [Addendum 12].) 
21
 Appellants were also substantially prejudiced because the jury was told in 
opening statement that Ford self certified and Ford was aware that the Explorer was 
failing its own accident avoidance maneuver tests. (R. 11486, pp.16-17 [Addendum 91].) 
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This isn't the (sic) Mr. Ingebretsen style: Trust me. These are my words. But I 
don't need to do tests, flf] We believe you do have to do tests if you want to 
prove something. Ford did that as they were designing the vehicle. They've 
done it afterward. It is not sensitive to this 235 versus 255 tire. It is not some 20 
pounds in the simulation makes a difference. That isn't the truth. (Id., p. 72, 
emphasis added.) 
The jury was required to find the defective condition "at the time the product was 
sold by the manufacturer...." (R. 10574 [Addendum 75].) Without the evidence, Ford 
was able to argue that appellants were unable to meet their burden of proof. 
VII. THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE FRAUD VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF FORD AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Ford again urges an incorrect standard of review. (Ford's Brief, p. 44.) A directed 
verdict can only be granted when no material fact exists. It does not involve harmless 
error review. See, JVay v. General Motors Corp., GMC TruckDiv., 850P.2d 1260, 1261, 
1264 (Utah 1993). 
Ford also argues only one type of common law fraud (Ford's Brief, p. 44) while 
complete ignores appellants' fraudulent concealment argument addressed in the opening 
brief.22/ (See, AOB, p. 46.) Utah Courts have found that an omission is actionable as 
22
 By arguing only the "advertising" issue, Ford omits the Amended Complaint's 
factual allegations of common law fraud alleged as follows: 
FORD conducted tests of the Explorer...received reports and/or information from 
its employees, vendors, government agencies, lawyers and others...about actual 
accidents, relating to the Explorer, its handling and its propensity to roll and 
cause injuries to its occupants. From this information, FORD learned about the 
defects complained of herein. Yet, despite this knowledge, FORD omitted to 
disclose to the plaintiffs and the rest of the buying public that the Explorer 
was defective and prone to lose control and roll over under normal driving 
conditions... (R. 731, Amended Complaint, f 52, emphasis added. [Addendum 
no 
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common law fraud.23/ To establish a claim for fraudulent concealment appellants were 
only required to show (1) the nondisclosed information was material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information was known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there was a legal duty to 
communicate. Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, P12 [94 P.3d 919] (Utah 2004). 
The Explorer brochure conveyed to the average consumer that Ford did everything 
in its power to engineer a "safe" vehicle including building strong doors, and that the 
Explorer could navigate difficult situations. (R. 11458, pp. 14,17, 18, 19, 21-22, 23, 24, 
25, 29, 30 [Addendum 47].) No rebuttal testimony was offered by Ford. 
Appellants' expert, David Ingebretsen, testified that the Explorer's tire size lifted 
the center of gravity; the larger tire size added to the instability of the SUV. (R. 11463, 
pp. 89-90 [Addendum 9].) Tony's father, Fred Clayton, was not required to testify that he 
relied upon the tire size to purchase the Explorer. (See, Ford's Brief, p. 46.) Mr. Clayton 
testified he saw a sales brochure before he purchased the SUV. (R. 11459, p. 10,11, 50-
51 [Addendum 10].) 
However, no one told the Clayton family that the tires on the Explorer were the 
wrong size or that the tires would make the SUV even more unstable and more dangerous 
This is similar to the Utah Attorney General's allegations. [See, Addendum 81.] 
23
 Utah case law acknowledges that "negligent misrepresentation is a form of 
fraud." Atkinson v. IHCHosps., Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990). See also 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) 
("Negligent misrepresentation is a tort which grew out of common-law fraud.9'); Robinson 
v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, P 31,21 P.3d 219 (Billings, J., dissenting) 
(identifying negligent misrepresentation as a "species59 of fraud). 
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to drive. {Id. at p. 16.) Ford knew the Explorer was failing its own stability testing with 
P-235 sized tires. [Addendum 35, p. 0619]; Addendum 27.] The base tire was P-225. 
Indeed, the 1997 Explorer brochure recommends only P-225 size tires on the XLT model. 
(Trial Exhibit 3 [Addendum 28].) Yet, Ford sold the XLT to the Clayton family in a 
condition which made it unstable and failed to warn them of the known danger. 
Ford illogically argues that the directed verdict was proper because Don Tandy 
who certified the Explorer as "resistant to rollover" using the "tweaked" computer 
modeling, testified the Explorer was stable and well-designed regardless of the tire 
option. (Ford's Brief, p. 46, fh. 29.) Ford's reasoning is once again flawed. The trial 
court granted Ford's motion for directed verdict before Don Tandy testified and could not 
have relied on the testimony to grant the directed verdict. (R. 10228,10247 [Addendum 
98].) Additionally, 
This Court should further consider that evidence relevant to the Explorer's 
stability, center of gravity design and the tire size which changed the center of gravity and 
made the vehicle inherently more dangerous was erroneously excluded from the jury's 
consideration. [Addendum 33, pp. 1276,1277; Addendum 35, p. 0619; Addendum 49.] 
Consequently, the directed verdict was improvidently granted. The fraudulent 
concealment issue should go to the jury upon a retrial.24/ 
24
 Even Utah's attorney general claimed the Explorer was car like when it had a 
high risk of rollover. The Explorer's instability is not simply about "Firestone" tires. 
(Ford's Brief, p. 45, fii. 28.) The SUV exceeds stability capacity by simply having a 
person in each seat. Indeed, the gravamen of the Attorney General's complaint was false 
advertising of the Ford Explorer. [Addendum 81.] 
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VIII. APPELLANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED PLAIN ERROR IMPLICIT IN 
THE TRIAL RECORD CITED IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF. THIS CASE 
IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM STATE V. BOYD, 2001 UT 30. 
A. Appellants9 Brief Demonstrates Plain Error. Ford's flawed reliance on 
State v. King, supra, 2006 UT 3, P13, to argue waiver should be rejected. Review is 
appropriate where plain error is demonstrated from the circumstances. State v. Cram, 
2002 UT 37, P9 [46 P.3d 230] (Utah 2002); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 
(Utah 1996). The trial court itself acknowledged error when it stated on the record that it 
was not appropriate for the jury to begin deliberations on this complex engineering case 
on a Friday afternoon. (R. 11487, p. 3 [Addendum 16]; See also, AOB, p. 47.) The 
record establishes plain error. See, State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, P48 [25 P.3d 985] (Utah 
2001). 
Moreover, appellants demonstrated "prejudicial error" from the facts argued in the 
opening brief. (See AOB p. 50.) Nothing precludes a reviewing court from taking notice 
of plain errors affecting the substantial rights of a party. Utah R. Evid. 103 (d). No magic 
words are required. See, State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Ford nonetheless argues that the jury did not complain about working through their 
lunch break and deliberating for another two and a half hours without being fed. (Ford's 
Brief, p. 47, fn. 30.) However, appellants do not know whether the jury complained or 
not because the jury notes were sealed without any explanation in the trial court's 
minutes. (R. 10550, 10551-10552.) Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11 (h), the Court can act 
on its own initiative and review the sealed record. 
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B. Boyd is also distinguishable. Contrary to Ford's argument, the 
circumstances here are quite different from Boyd, 2001 UT 30, P48. In Boyd, the jury did 
not begin deliberations without eating lunch. In Boyd, there was no limited examination 
of evidence. (R. 11483, pp. 124-125 [Addendum 12].) Indeed, the Boyd trial involved a 
simple deliberation - whether the defendant committed rape.25/ In contrast, after hearing 
weeks of complex engineering testimony, the jury also had to potentially review and 
weigh over 280 exhibits presented by both sides. [Addendum 18.] There were also 51 
jury instructions given. The jury instructions and alternative theories of product liability 
alone warranted extended deliberations. Thus, reversal is required. 
IX. APPELLANTS DID NOT LEAD THE COURT INTO ERROR; IT 
OCCURRED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO PERFORM ITS 
OFFICIAL DUTY TO INSURE JUROR NO. 3 WAS NOT BIASED. 
Ford restates the issue to argue "invited error55 by ignoring the fact that appellants' 
counsel asked the trial court to voir dire Juror No. 3 as follows: I think we probably 
should voir dire him further to be certain that, that he hasn't - if he has committed 
himself already I think it might be cause for recusing him. (Emphasis added; R. 11466, 
pp. 4-5 [Addendum 15].) 
The Court rejected counsel'& request stating: ..J don't think we have enough here 
to move forward to any second stage....(Ibid.: emphasis added.) 
There was no "invited error." The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to give 
die trial court the first opportunity to address the error. State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
25
 Contrary to Ford's argument, the issue is one of first impression in a complex 
civil case. (Ford's Brief, p. 47.) Unlike Boyd, the jury verdict was not unanimous. 
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16, P12 [6 P.3d 742] (Utah 2004). Ford unreasonably argues that appellants never moved 
for a mistrial or moved to disqualify Juror No. 3. (Ford's Brief, p. 49.) The problem is 
that appellants did not have sufficient cause to remove the juror because the court refused 
appellants9 request to voir dire the juror; hence, no ground for a mistrial. Moreover, the 
decision to grant or deny a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, P14 [72 P.3d 127] (Utah Ct App. 2003). Ford's 
argument also silently ignores that the day before the bailiff informed the court of Juror 
No. 3's potential bias, Ford had made a mistrial motion complaining about the unhappy 
juror, which was denied. (R. 11472, p. 51; see also, R. 9893 [Addendum 87].) Without 
being able to show actual bias, any further objection would have been futile. The law 
does not require futile acts. See Scheufler v. General Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261,1268 
(10th Cir. Kan. 1997). 
Notwithstanding, questions of waiver often hinge on the critical element of intent. 
Before finding waiver, a court should look at the totality of the circumstances in 
discerning intent. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2006 
UT 35, P22 [2006 UT 35] (Utah 2006). Ford argues appellants invited error by merely 
agreeing that a cautionary instruction was then appropriate.26/ There was no intent to 
waive the issue and no invited error. Rather, the error occurred when the court refused to 
perform its official duty to move to the "second stage" and examine or allow counsel to 
question Juror No. 3 and allowed the juror to remain on the jury without further questions 
26
 The court's separation admonition advised the jury to not talk among themselves 
about the case and not to form any opinions. 
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designed to probe the extent and the depth of the juror's bias.27/ Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6); 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, P36 [992 P.2d 951] (Utah 1999); West v. Holley, 2004 UT 
97, P15 [103 P.3d 708] (Utah 2004); State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, P49 [55 P.3d 573] 
(Utah 2002); State v. King, supra, UT 3, P19. 
X. APPELLANTS MOVED TO EXCLUDE THE STATISTICAL 
EVIDENCE CHART AND TESTIMONY BEFORE TRIAL AND ALSO 
FILED THEIR WRITTEN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
457; THE ISSUE IS REVIEWABLE. 
Ford claims that Exhibit 457 was introduced without any objection. (Ford's Brief, 
p. 51.) Not true. Appellants moved to exclude the statistical evidence AND opinion 
testimony in a pretrial motion (R. 7647-7657, [Addendum 19]) which the trial court 
denied. (R. 9591 [Addendum 21].) Appellants also filed a written objection to Ford's 
Exhibit 457 based on Evid. R. 401, 402, 403 and 702. (R. R. 9698 [Addendum 85].) 
Thereafter, the court heard argument and issued a pretrial ruling. (R. 959 L) 
Utah R. Evid. 103 (a)(2) states: "Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the 
record admitting...evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an 
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal." Emphasis added; 
see also, State v. Dominguez, supra, 2003 UT App 158, PI8, citing State v. Saunders, 
supra, 1999 UT 59, PP18-19 (holding because defendant objected to the court's pretrial 
ruling, he was not required to make a further objection at trial to preserve the issue for 
27
 Appellants have demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion. Juror No. 3 
was an engineer. The bailiff overheard Juror No. 3 say: "You guys know what I think 
already." (R. 11466, pp. 3-4 [Addendum 15].) 
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appeal). Failure to raise a futile objection should not constitute waiver. / Furthermore, 
even if the issue was not preserved, it can be reviewed to avoid duplication of the error on 
remand. See, Dale bout v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 1999 UT App 151, P23 [980P.2d 1194] 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
It was in this context that Ford thereafter introduced the statistical chart during 
cross-examination of appellants' engineering expert witness, David Ingebretsen. Ford 
asked Ingebretsen about the data. To this Ingebretsen replied: "There were a lot of 
qualifiers in there. What this chart shows is that just 1 or 2 percent of the total rollovers 
recorded in this database were 16 quarter turns. [Addendum 95, pp. 28, 31.]29/ Ingebretsen 
did not adopt the "statistical" chart testimony relied upon by Ford's expert and did not 
attest to its accuracy.30/ Ford's argument is fallacious. The other less severe accident data 
could have resulted because the other vehicles were designed safer or stronger than the 
Ford Explorer. The other design evidence was prejudicial and inadmissible. 
28
 This is not a case where appellants stood silently by allowing prejudicial error to 
occur. Appellants took affirmative steps by moving to exclude the prejudicial statistical 
evidence pretrial with an offer of proof, and then filed written objections to this evidence. 
Rule 103 (a)(2) only requires that the court be given opportunity address the error. See 
also, State v. Harter, 2007 UT App 5, P26 [155 P.3d 116] (Utah Ct. App. 2007). Because 
the admissibility of the statistical evidence was purely a question of law, a 
contemporaneous verbal objection would have been futile. 
29
 Ford only cites to the Exhibit List without submitting Ingebretsen's trial 
testimony. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11 (h), this Court can augment the record to 
determine the truth of what occurred. (Appellants previously moved to augment the 
record with a transcript lodged by DepoMax with the Court, but appellants' motion was 
denied on July 11, 2008.) 
30
 Ford argues Ingebretsen testified that the statistics were available in SAE 
papers. (Ford's Brief, p. 51, fh. 31.) Ingebretsen did NOT adopt the chart's reliability. 
30 
Ford's "statistical" chart and Germane5s inadmissible opinion on causation was 
derived from other accident evidence which included light trucks, SUVs, vans, pickup 
trucks and passenger cars. (R. 11452, p. 112 [Addendum 20].) This same type of 
testimony that was categorically rejected in Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 160 
Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1135/7 The other accident statistical evidence should have been 
excluded because it did not meet the substantially similar circumstances requirement 
according to Utah case law which would permit admissibility. See, Ostler v. Albina 
Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445,449 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Finally, Ford's brief, p. 52, ignores that the jury was asked to rely upon the 
statistical evidence. Ford argued: 
... And therefore it is worse, as measured by quarter turns, than 99.9 percent of the 
accidents. And again, I think I've heard some criticism, Oh, statistics don't tell you 
what happened. You can look at that chart and see exactly what happened. 
They were in one of the worst accidents in rollovers that are studied in the country. 
Ninety-nine point nine percent are less severe. (Emphasis added; R. 11483, pp. 
47-48 [Addendum 12].) 
There is a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of the trial. Larsen v. 
Johnson, supra, 958 P.2d 953, 958. The jury was invited to analyze the chart and 
statistical evidence to see "exactly what happened." 
Thus, based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that 
appellants had not met their burden of proof. 
/ / / 
31
 In the Buell-Wilson, Ford's proposed testimony compared the Explorer's rollover 
performance to a variety of dissimilar vehicles, including Greyhound buses and passenger 
cars. (Ibid.) 
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XI. FORD REFRAMES THE ISSUE. APPELLANTS' BRIEF CONTENDS 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING TROOPER PACE TO 
TESTIFY AS AN "EXPERT" BASED ON HIS SUPERFICIAL 
INVESTIGATION. 
First, prior to trial, the court ruled that Trooper Pace had personal knowledge of 
the scene and advanced training in accident reconstruction and could offer testimony. (R. 
6555 [Addendum 22].) Thereafter, appellants again moved to exclude Pace's "expert" 
seatbelt testimony as cumulative (R. 7798, 7801-7803 [Addendum 24]) and his other 
opinions and conclusions as speculative. (R. 7934-7947 [Addendum 23].) Appellants' 
pretrial motions were again denied. (R. 9593-9594 [Addendum 21].) No further objection 
was required. Evid. R. 103 (a)(2).32/ 
Against this backdrop, appellants were in the position of making a Hobson's 
choice of having to explain Trooper Pace's anticipated testimony before it was presented 
to the jury at trial by Ford. At no time, did appellants acquiesce to allow Pace to testify as 
an "expert." As a matter of fact, after Pace testified, appellants again moved to strike 
Pace's speculative causation opinion testimony that bordered on an "expert" opinion, but 
again their motion was denied.33/ (R. 11479, p. 94 [Addendum 6].) 
32
 Ford reframes the issue. Appellants invited no error. Evid. R. 103 (a)(2). 
33
 Appellants' objections to Paces' expert testimony preserved review. The 
introduction of the accident report, Exhibit P-22 [Addendum 88] did not waive the issue. 
(See, Ford's Brief, p. 53.) Appellants sought to introduce only the official portion of the 
report that contained the measurements to the skid marks. Ford later introduced its 
version of the accident report with coded boxes that Trooper Pace had checked which 
required a key for the jury to interpret. (R. 11479, pp. 48 -52 [Addendum 86].) It was 
Pace's speculative "expert" opinions which appellants objected to before trial and after 
his testimony, not the diagrams or marks in the police report, done by other officers. 
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The error was not harmless.34/ Ford used Pace's testimony to convincingly argue: 
It was his [Pace's] job to figure out what happened in this accident. (R. 11483, p. 
12 [Addendum 12].) 
This is an individual whose job it is to figure out what occurred. (R. 11483, p. 13 
[Addendum 12].) 
This isn't a paid expert. This is the guy whose job it was to understand what 
happened. (R. 11483, p. 14 [Addendum 12].) 
Let's go through the evidence you've heard. First of all with Officer Pace. He did 
an investigation...It isn't just happenstance. It's inattention...He's studied it. He's 
investigated it. "Trooper Pace, after completing your investigation and 
completing your report, can you tell us your general conclusion?9 He says: 
'My general conclusion is the driver was asleep or inattentive. He was either 
picking something up, ran off the road to the left, overcorrected back to the 
right, overcorrected back to the left.' Okay? This isn't a paid expert. This is 
the man on the scene that day. Trying to understand what 
happened...Inattentive. Off the road. Asleep.... (Emphasis added; R. 11483, pp. 
17-18 [Addendum 12].) 
Officer Pace again: 'You have training about inattentiveness or asleep?' This 
isn't guess. He says: 'Yes. We're given training. We're taught to understand 
when you can perceive that happened and when not.' It's part of his training. 
And then he was asked: "Comparing this accident to other accidents, is this 
consistent with sleeping and inattentiveness?' And he says: 'Yes, very consistent.' 
And then we talked about - a little bit about his accident report, where he 
determines that it was a prime contributor that he was asleep or inattentive... So 
now we've covered Officer Pace. Not a paid expert.... (Emphasis added; R. 
11483, pp. 18-19 [Addendum 12].) 
Reversible error has been demonstrated. Utah R. Civ. P.59 (a)(7). Ford's 
argument that police officers' testimony is routinely admitted in Utah courts is flawed. 
(Ford's Brief, p. 55.) In Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, supra, 17 Utah 2d 221, 224,226, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the record did not disclose a proper foundation to 
See, Larsen v. Johnson, supra, 958 P.2d 953, 958. 
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support the officer's opinion testimony as to the point of impact. The officer did not see 
the actual impact; therefore his opinion had to be based upon facts derived from his 
investigation. The Supreme Court reasoned: 
"Was this error prejudicial? Yes. The point of impact was an important fact, if not 
a controlling one, to be determined by the jury in reaching its verdict. The lay eye 
witnesses differed in their testimony as to which side of the road the vehicles were 
on when they collided. It is only fair to assume that a jury would be impressed by 
and give considerable weight to the testimony of a patrolman with 24 years of 
experience in accident investigations. There is a reasonable likelihood that in the 
absence of such testimony the jury might have reached a different result." 
Likewise, the jury in appellants' case was was asked to, and likely gave great 
weight and respect to Trooper Pace's unpaid "expert" causation opinion. Therefore, 
prejudicial error has been demonstrated. Reversal is required. 
XII. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL CUMULATIVE ERROR WHICH 
DEPRIVED APPELLANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
The combination of errors constitutes cumulative error and warrants a new trial. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., supra, 801 P.2d 920, 928. 
* * * 
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FORD'S CROSS-APPEAL 
XIII. FORD'S CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED. 
At trial, it was Ford's burden to prove facts essential to the defense of statute of 
limitations. Stevens v. Roberts, 16 Utah 105, 109 [51 P. 261] (Utah 1897). 
A. This Court should Reject Ford's Appeal of the Jury's Finding Because Ford 
has Failed to Marshal the Evidence. The Jury's Special Finding Should 
Stand. 
Ford's special jury verdict question invited the jury to objectively identify a date 
when Kellie should have known that Ford was responsible for her injuries. Ford has the 
obligation to marshal the evidence and to demonstrate that the jury's finding lacks 
substantial evidentiary support. In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). At 
trial, Ford did not present any evidence when Kellie's law suit was filed in her behalf by 
her attorneys. (See Ford's Brief, p. 56.) Having presented no evidence, Ford cannot 
complain that the jury's special finding was erroneous.35/ 
Furthermore, the jury's finding was not per se unreasonable or against the weight of 
the evidence. Tony's father, Fred Clayton, testified that it was late in September 2000, that 
he found internet research about the Explorer. He only thereafter made the decision to sue 
Ford. Mr. Clayton wanted to be sure that Ford was at fault before suing the company. He 
did not discuss his subsequent decision to sue Ford with Kellie. After he wrote a letter in 
March 1999 to Geico Insurance to help seek compensation for Kellie's medical expenses, 
35
 To mount a successful attack, Ford must marshal all the evidence and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence 
is insufficient. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Ford has failed 
to present evidence at trial which would support its version of the facts. 
35 
Mr. Clayton wanted Kellie to get on with her life since it was painful for him to talk about 
his son's death with her. (R. 11459, pp. 30, 31, 33, 94, 96-97 [Addendum 89].) 
Kellie was not allowed to testify regarding the extent of her brain injury or her 
emotional problems caused by the rollover. With the help of Tony's father, Kellie sent a 
letter to the insurance company to recover her medical expenses. A month later, on April 
13, 1999, Kellie hired attorney Keith Barton to pursue her claim against Geico Insurance 
Company. On June 29, 1999, Kellie signed a release of her claims against Geico, ending 
Barton's brief representation.36/ When Kellie signed the settlement agreement, she had no 
knowledge of the Explorer's design defects. Ford took Kellie's deposition on October 28, 
2003.37/ Kellie testified that she was represented by Brian Steffensen; she met with him 
before her deposition on that date. Tony's father did not tell her to sue Ford. (R. 11478, 
pp. 16-17,18,26, 28, 43, 44, 47, 48, 60, 69, 70, 73 [Addendum 90].) 
It is clear from the evidence presented at trial, and Jury Instruction No. 46 (R. 
10599) which was given, the jury objectively believed Kellie reasonably knew or should 
have known of her claims against Ford by the date of her deposition. Because the special 
finding was not against the weight of the evidence presented at trial to the jury - the 
special finding must stand upon retrial. 
/ / / 
36
 Ford did not call Barton as a witness to establish he had any prior knowledge 
that the Explorer was defectively designed. 
37
 Ford was not contending that Kellie released any claims against Ford when she 
signed the settlement agreement. 
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B. The Trial Court did not Err in Denying Ford's Summary Judgment Motion 
against Kellie Montoya Based on the Statute of Limitations Ground, because 
there were Contested Issues of Fact as to When Kellie Should have 
Reasonably Discovered the Explorer's Design Defects; Due Diligence cannot 
be Resolved at the Summary Judgment Stage. 
Ford did not appeal the trial court's denial of its partial summary judgment motion. 
(R. 11397-11398 [Addendum 97].) Thus, this Court should decline to review the issue. 
Notwithstanding, the trial court did not err since the issue involved a question of due 
diligence. The general rule which applies to the "discovery rule," is that the statute of 
limitation is tolled until the plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) all of the facts 
that form the basis for the cause of action. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co,, 857 P.2d 
250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As the Aragon court acknowledged, a plaintiff does not have enough information to 
sue until he knows that he has been injured, he knows the identity of the maker of the 
product, and he knows that the product had a causal relation to his injury. Id. at p. 253, 
emphasis added, citing Hickman v. Grover, 178 W.Va. 249, 358 S.E.2d 810, 813 (W.Va. 
1987). It is this third prong which created a triable issue at trial. 
In most states, a plaintiffs lack of knowledge of a product's defect causing 
personal injury affects the statute of limitations if a reasonably prudent and intelligent 
person could not, without specialized knowledge, have been made aware of such cause. In 
these cases, the cause of action begins to accrue when the injured person knew, or by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the defect or the cause of the 
injury. Similarly, if there is fraudulent concealment of the defect in the product, then the 
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statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraudulent concealment should have 
been discovered. Sawtell v. E.I. Du PontDe Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 
N.M. 1994) citations omitted. 
In its summary judgment motion, Ford presented no evidence that Kellie spoke with 
Tony's father about the Ford Explorer lawsuit. On the other hand, appellants contested 
several disputed facts related to due diligence. (R. 2815-2819; 2843-2842.) Indeed, the 
extent of the Explorer's defective design and instability was not known until NHTSA 
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) and the states attorney generals began 
their investigations into the safety of the Ford Explorer. Due diligence in determining the 
causal relationship of the defective product to the causal injury is an unresolved question 
of fact, which precluded partial summary judgment in favor of Ford. See, Aragon v. 
Clover Club Foods Co., supra, 857 P.2d 250, 254 citing North Coast Air Services, Ltd. v. 
Grumman Corp., 759 P.2d 405,411 (Wash. 1988) (due diligence was an unresolved 
question of fact precluding summary judgment). 
Finally, Ford argues the trial court should have granted summary judgment in its 
favor because Montoya hired Keith Barton on April 13, 1999. (Ford's Brief, p. 57.) Ford 
again falsely portrays the record stating: "Mr. Barton even inspected the vehicle." (Ford's 
Brief, p. 60.) The actual transcript states exactly the opposite. Attorney Barton testified at 
his deposition: "there was not an inspection of the vehicle by our office." (R. 2691, pp. 
2703-2704 [Addendum 93].) 
Ford had the record and cited to it in making its inaccurate claim to this Court in its 
38 
brief. There is no evidence whatsoever that Barton inspected the Explorer and should 
have known of the defects. In fact, Ford presented no evidence other than its own 
conjecture that attorney Barton was hired to conduct an investigation. Summary judgment 
was appropriately denied. 
XIV. FORD'S FRIVOLOUS REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AS COSTS 
FOR RESPONDING TO ISSUES 1, 8, 9, 10 AND 11 SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
Ford's contention it should be awarded attorney fees under Utah R. App. P. 33 
should be rejected. (Ford's Brief, pp. 61.) Sanctions for frivolous appeals38/ should only 
be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower court decisions. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Ford argues at p. 61, fn. 38, that appellants should be sanctioned for carefully 
wording that Issue VIII "is an issue of first impression in a civil case in Utah." Ford's 
contention is frivolous. This is a true statement. (See Issue VIIL) 
Ford argues at p. 61, fh. 39, that appellants stipulated to a limiting instruction. Ford 
has refrained the issue. Appellants asked the trial court to voir dire of the juror to 
determine bias. Appellants' request was rejected prior to the court giving a "cautionary" 
instruction. There was no invited error. (See Issue IX.) 
Ford argues at p. 61, in. 40, that appellants did not object to the statistical chart, but 
fails to acknowledge appellants filed a pretrial motion with an offer of proof, and 
thereafter also filed evidentiary objections to Exhibit 457. (R. 7934-7947 [Addendum 23] 
38
 A frivolous appeal is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. 
39 
see also 7798, 7801-7803 [Addendum 24]; R. 9698, 9730 [Addendum 85].) Under Utah R. 
Evid. 103 (a)(2) the issue was preserved for appeal. (See Issue X.)
 t 
Ford argues at p. 61, fn. 41, that Fred Clayton testified to what Trooper Pace told 
him which invited error. Ford again reframes the issue. At no time did appellants agree 
that Pace was an "expert55 who could offer "expert55 testimony based on his superficial 
investigation. Appellants also moved to strike Pace's "expert55 opinion testimony at trial. 
(R. 11479, R.T. 1/30/07, p. 94 [Addendum 6].) The issue is reviewable. (See Issue XI.) 
Ford's Brief offers no basis at all for sanctioning appellants for raising Issue I, the 
denial of appellants5 motion for new trial on R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) grounds. 
Appellants have demonstrated trial error. Appellants5 claims are grounded in facts 
and supported by legal reasoning to justify review of the issues. Appellants have also 
submitted addendums 1-100, citing to the relevant portions of the record on review. 
Accordingly, Ford's motion is frivolous and based on non-sanctionable grounds. Ford's 
request for attorney's fees should be denied. 
XV. APPELLANTS5 REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY5S FEES AND COSTS 
SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
On the other hand, appellants should be awarded attorney's fees and costs under 
Utah R. App. P. 33 for having to respond to Ford's frivolous, false and misleading 
statements of the record, and misstatements of the law to argue waiver, harmless error or 
invited error. 
Additionally, Ford's cross-appeal on the jury's special finding regarding the statute 
of limitations date is clearly frivolous because Ford failed to marshal the evidence to 
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support its appeal of the jury's special finding and failed to introduce a date Kellie's law 
suit was filed at trial. Ford's cross-appeal based on the trial court's denial of its partial 
summary judgment motion is also frivolous because Ford failed to appeal that issue. (R. 
11397-11398 [Addendum 97].) Thus, pursuant to R. App. P. 33(c)(1), this Court should 
consider awarding appellants its attorney's fees and costs required to respond to Ford's 
frivolously raised contentions and legally unsound argument. 
Ford's factual misrepresentations of fact and law should be found frivolous under 
Utah R. App. P. 33, applying a Utah R. Civ. P. 11 analysis. See for example, Morse v. 
Packer, supra, 2000 UT 86, P29, 31. Or alternatively, this Court, on its own initiative, may 
enter an order directing Ford's counsel to show cause why it has not violated Utah R. Civ. 
P. 11 (b). See, UtahR. Civ. P. 11 (c)(1)(b). Ford's misstatement of Barton's deposition 
testimony which was submitted in the summary judgment proceeding warrants such sua 
sponte order. 
The numerous instances are set out in the reply brief. Appellants estimate that 
approximately 70 percent of the time expended to research and draft the reply brief to 
Ford's misstatements of facts and law. 
* * * 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully ask this Court to reverse the judgment and remand the case 
for a new trial with instructions including ordering an evidentiary hearing on the Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) grounds if necessary. Appellants pray that the remand include other 
instructions on the admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence and an order that the 
retrial shall not be bifurcated. 
Cross-appellee, Kellie Montoya-Baker asks this Court to affirm the jury's verdict 
and judgment on the statute of limitations finding. 
Appellants further ask this court to consider awarding appellants its attorney's fees 
and costs required to respond to Ford's frivolously raised contentions and arguments as 
stated herein. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 2 / _ day of July, 2 p j & 8 ^ ^ \ 
—
 ' ^ ihor O. Emblem ^ ^ 
Tracy L. Emblem 
Matthew H. Raty 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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